Case Studies - Secure Voting Protocols

Presented by Adam Anthony and Rick Carback

Introduction

"Current electronic voting machines at polling places do not give receipts. Rather, they require prospective voters to trust them - without proof or confirming evidence - to correctly record each vote and include it in the final tally. Receipts could assure voters that their intended votes are counted. However, receipts have so far not been allowed because of the secret ballot principle, which forbids voters from taking anything out of the polling place that could be used to show others how they voted. The reason for this is to prevent schemes that could improperly influence voters, such as vote selling and various forms of coercion.

Secure voting offers a fundamentally new kind of receipt. In the voting booth, the voter can see his or her choices clearly printed on the receipt. After taking it out of the booth, the voter can use it to ensure that the votes it contains are included correctly in the final tally. But, because the choices are safely encrypted before it is removed from the booth, the receipt cannot be used to show others how the voter voted." - Abstract

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